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Abstract 
 
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a fund within the framework of the UNFCCC founded as a 
mechanism to assist developing countries in adaptation and mitigation practices to counter climate 
change. In this paper, we analyze the flow of funds among countries and investigate, through a 
counterfactual analysis, their effectiveness. The results show that as result of the receipt of the funds, 
countries reduced their GHG emission and have been incentivized in the replacement of fossil 
sources with renewable sources. Finally, also a leverage effect of the funds for economic 
development of the recipient countries comes into the light. 
 
Keywords: Renewable and non-renewable energy sources; counterfactual analysis; economic 
growth; climate finance 
 
JEL Classifications: C21, C54, O44, 047. 
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1. Introduction 
During the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) held in December 2009 in Copenhagen, 
developed countries pledged to provide new and additional resources to combat climate change, 
approaching USD 30 billion for the 2010-2012 period, with balanced allocation between mitigation 
and adaptation. This collective commitment has come to be known as ‘fast-start finance’ and 
prefigures the institution of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) established by the 194 countries that are 
party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2010, with a mission to support a 
paradigm shift in the global response to climate change. It allocates its resources to low-emissions 
and climate-resilient projects and programs in developing countries. The Fund pays particular 
attention to the needs of societies that are highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, in 
particular Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and African 
States. These funds can be considered a preliminary version of the funding mechanism provided 
during the 21st COP in Paris, in which countries acted based on the goal of keeping the temperature 
increase on our planet below 2°C to reduce the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, 
which reached the symbolic and significant milestone of 400 parts per million for the first time in 
2015 and surged again to new records in 2016 (W.M.O., 2016). 
The provisions of these financial instruments entail that donor governments distribute funds to 
recipient developing countries to finance concrete adaptation projects and programs to reduce the 
adverse effects of climate change that communities, countries and sectors are facing. Global climate 
finance architecture is complex: there are, in fact, a growing number of recipient countries that have 
established national climate change funds and that receive funding from multiple developed 
countries. A critical issue is the transparency of the implementation status of climate finance 
initiatives. Moreover, the proliferation of climate finance mechanisms increases the challenges of 
coordinating and accessing finance. In this context, the monitoring of countries’ emissions to 
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evaluate their progress toward reduction goals assumes an important meaning regarding the 
effectiveness of the policy of the climate funds. 
Climate finance has been explored previously. Ellis et al. (2013) explore how different communities 
view climate finance effectiveness, the policies or institutional pre-conditions that facilitate 
effectiveness, and how effectiveness is currently monitored and evaluated. Bird et al. (2013) 
describe an approach to measuring the effectiveness of the national systems that support climate 
finance delivery. They assess three interlinked elements of government administration: the policy 
environment, which supports climate change expenditures; the institutional architecture, which 
determines the relevant roles and responsibilities; and the public financial system, through which 
climate change-related expenditures are channeled. The OECD, in collaboration with Climate 
Policy Initiatives (2015), provided a status check on the level of climate finance mobilized by 
developed countries in 2013 and 2014. 
International cooperation on finance has the potential to help countries manage such tradeoffs and 
create new incentives for low-carbon development. Climate finance can support policies that can 
build resilience against the threats posed by climate change (Nakhooda and Norman, 2014). 
In a recent paper, Carfora et al. (2017) find that funds directed to “fast-start finance” meet the 
requirements of ensuring the reduction in GHG and promoting the sustainable development of 
developing countries. To improve the effectiveness of climate funds, they suggest redesigning aid 
schemes not only to combat climate change but also to promote resilience to extreme events and to 
reduce dependence on preferential channels with developed countries.  
Despite the relevance of the topic, the effectiveness of the distribution of climate funds and how 
these funds can mitigate the impact of anthropogenic activities have not been previously explored.  
In this paper, we analyze the flow of funds among countries and conduct a counterfactual analysis 
to respond to the main research questions of the paper: i) have the recipient countries achieved the 
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objectives of GHG emission reduction for which the funds were granted? ii) Are these funds useful 
for the countries in incentivizing the replacement of fossil sources with renewable sources? iii) Is 
there a leverage effect for economic development? Moreover, for each question, if the response is 
positive, we want to quantify these effects, making a comparison with the similar counterparts 
represented by non-recipient countries. To achieve our aims, we employ propensity score matching 
(PSM) analysis on a large dataset of 1491 countries that includes countries that have received funds 
in 2010 (treated – 83 counties) and those that have not received funds (untreated – 66 countries). 
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a statistical method that permits the construction of a 
probabilistic match among units that have participated in a treatment (treated) and units that have 
not participated (untreated), utilizing characteristics that are common to both groups (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983). The results can be useful in determining the effectiveness of the climate 
mechanism and testing whether they are useful in promoting RES generation and combating climate 
change, reducing the impact of anthropogenic activities.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we report the methodology 
employed, whereas Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports the results, and Section 5 offers 
some concluding remarks.  
 
 
 
 
2. Theory and methods 
                                                          
1 To assess the impact of “fast-start finance,” the dataset refers to the AidData Research Release 2.1 (of which the last 
year is 2010) because the disbursements are not made available in the new release of the AidData (Released: 
2016/04/29), which includes commitments that are not sufficient for evaluating the impact of this policy measure. 
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The aim of climate finance is the promotion of green growth and, consequently, a reduction in 
GHG emissions. Bearing this assumption in mind, we believe that countries that have received 
climate funds have reduced the impact of anthropogenic activities on environment with respect to 
countries that have not received the funds. On the basis of this assumption, there are differences 
between treated and untreated countries regarding the convenience of producing electricity by 
renewable or fossil sources. Because the aim of this paper is to investigate whether these differences 
are a direct effect of climate funds, quantifying its magnitude, a counterfactual analysis is conducted 
to compare the ex post realized outcome of the treated countries with a counterfactual outcome of 
the untreated countries that, under certain assumptions, reproduces the ex ante situation.  
Counterfactuals have been previously used to examine a range of statistical and 
macroeconometric questions. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) examine the effect of terrorism on the 
Basque. Pesaran and Smith (2016) examine the effects of the quantitative easing introduced in the 
UK after March 2009. Hsiao, Ching and Wan (2011) study the effect of political and economic 
integration with mainland China on output growth in Hong Kong, constructing counterfactuals 
based on predictions from similar economies. In some recent works, PSM is used concerning macro 
policy evaluation borrowing techniques from the micro literature to obtain an estimate of an average 
treatment effect. Angrist, Jorda and Kuersteiner (2013), drawing on a previous work (Angrist and 
Kuersteiner, 2011), estimate the effect of monetary policy. They measure the average effect of 
policy changes on future values of the outcome variables (inflation, industrial production, and 
unemployment), inversely weighted by policy propensity scores in a manner similar to that used to 
adjust non-random samples. Jorda and Taylor (2013) use similar procedures to estimate the effect 
of fiscal policy. Romano et al. (2016) investigate some specific features related to the energy policy 
choices of countries, based on the comparison and matching of variables drawn from a 
macroeconomic panel dataset. 
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Let us consider that the treatment indicator, Ii, is equal to 1 if individual i receives the treatment 
and otherwise 0. The match is made based on a score, i.e., the propensity score, which consists of 
the conditioned probability that each individual will participate in the treatment given by a series of 
covariates (the control variables chosen to represent the common characteristics of the individuals). 
One possible identification strategy is to assume that, given a set of observable covariates X, which 
are not affected by the treatment, the potential outcomes are independent of the treatment 
assignment. The implication is that selection is solely based on observable characteristics and that 
all variables that influence the treatment assignment and potential outcomes are observed 
simultaneously. 
The application of the PSM technique requires the execution of several sequential steps (Rubin, 
1997): 
1. A variable indicator Ii is fixed for each individual, assuming the value of 1 if the individual 
results as being treated and otherwise 0. 
2. The evaluation of a probit/logit regression model of the following type: 
 =  +  	



 (2.1) 
3. The creation of a vector of the propensity scores composed of i-scalers, each of which is 
equal to the following: 
 =  =  = 1| (2.2) 
where φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a normal distribution (if one has chosen 
to estimate the scores with a probit model) or a logistic distribution (if one has chosen to estimate 
the scores with a logit model) and X is the vector of the covariates included in the model as control 
variables. It ensures that individuals with the same X values have a positive probability of being 
both participants and non-participants (Heckman et al. 1999). 
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4. The matching, based on the similarity of the scores, of the individuals treated with those 
untreated. 
The most frequently utilized matching method is nearest neighbor matching (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983). This procedure consists of matching to each treated individual another untreated 
individual who has the nearest numerical propensity score.  
Once the match has been made, the parameter that received the most attention in the evaluation 
literature is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is defined as follows: 
where Y(1) represents the value of the variable Y of the i-th individual exposed to the treatment and 
Y(0) represents the value that would have been for the same individual in the absence of treatment. 
Because the counterfactual expected value [0| = 1 is not observed for the treated, it is 
approximated with the value of the most similar j-th individuals in terms of the propensity scores. 
Equation 2.3 becomes: 
The difference between the left-hand side of equation 2.4 and tATT is the so-called self-selection bias 
that is not observed; the lower it is, the better defined is the propensity score model. 
The algorithm that serves as the basis of nearest neighbor matching predicts that each untreated 
individual, once he or she is matched, is re-inserted into the procedure to be possibly matched to 
another treated individual that is, however, numerically near it (based on a predefined margin). For 
this reason, at the end of the procedure, each untreated individual can be:    
a)  matched to only one treated individual 
b) matched to more than one untreated individual 
c) unmatched 
 =  | = 1 = [1| = 1 − [0| = 1 (2.3) 
 = [1| = 1 − [0| = 1
=  "## +  [1| = 1 − [%0& = 0' 
(2.4) 
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To be effective, the matching should balance the characteristics across the treated and respective 
matched comparison groups. To evaluate whether this objective has been achieved, the results of 
the matching can be explored by inspecting the distribution of the propensity scores in the treated 
and matched comparison groups. These should appear similar. Observable differences should raise 
concerns over the success of the match. The comparison of the summary statistics of the covariates 
used for the matching between the treated and matched groups is another important indicator of the 
degree to which the matching has been successful in balancing. 
3. Data 
To analyze the effectiveness of climate funds and assess the impact on the environmental 
performance of countries, we investigate how the climate funds destined to “Energy generation and 
supply” and to “General environmental protection” have helped countries to move toward a 
reduction in the effect of anthropogenic activities on the atmosphere and how these funds promote 
economic growth. To reach these goals, we use a large dataset of 149 countries that includes 
countries that have received funds in 2010 (treated – 83 counties) and those that did not receive 
funds (untreated – 66 countries). Furthermore, the variables can be grouped as target and control 
indicators.  
Untreated countries, although similar to treated countries in terms of the control variables, have a 
different behavior in terms of the target variables because the former (control variables) are not 
affected by climate funds whereas the latter (target variables) are. These differences, under the 
hypothesis that, without the funds (received two years before), the treated countries would be similar 
to the untreated countries, also in terms of the target variables, are quantified and interpreted as the 
effects of the policy (Rajeev and Sadek, 2002). 
Among the target variables, we include:  
those for which climate funds aim to increase:  
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i) the share of renewable energy in the total energy generated (shren);  
ii) electricity generation (elgen): the electric power generated from other sources of 
primary energy weighted for the share of the population covered by electric grids; 
and 
iii) per capita GDP (gdp); 
those for which climate funds aim to reduce:  
iv) per capita CO2 emissions (co2), proxy for total GHG emissions; and  
v) the share of fossil energy in the total energy generated (shfoss).  
 In the group of control variables, we consider those typically indicated by the previous literature 
(see, e.g., Marques et al., 2011; Romano et al., 2015 and 2016) as key factors that drive countries 
toward increasing generation from renewable energy sources: electricity consumption, the oil 
supply, energy intensity, the female population and the population growth rate.  
The electricity consumption variable (elcons) is included in the group of control variables because, 
in several macroeconomic analyses, it is commonly assumed that it is a proxy for the level of 
economic development. Richer countries are able to better promote investments in renewable energy 
sources (RESs) by employing different forms of grants and incentives (Romano and Scandurra, 
2014; Romano et al., 2015). However, higher incomes can imply additional electricity consumption, 
that is, from available fossil generation, to maintain citizens’ perception of their quality of life 
(Marques et al., 2011). The increase in energy consumption can lead policymakers to build new 
RES power plants, taking advantage to reach this aim through the climate funds. The total oil supply 
(oil), measured in terms of the production of crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas plant 
liquids and other liquids, and the gain in refinery processing, is included in the group of control 
variables because, with this indicator, we can control for lobbying effects (see, e.g., Marques et al., 
2011; Marques and Fuinhas, 2012). Where these resources are used intensively, we expect a poor 
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propensity for the usage of climate funds by countries. In this group, we also include energy intensity 
(ei). As argued by Romano et al. (2015), more developed economies are also oriented toward 
production efficiency improvement and low-energy intensity, and for these reasons, the ratio 
between energy consumption and GDP can be considered a proxy for technological and economic 
progress. Because our dataset contains mainly developing countries, which are more oriented toward 
the use of traditional energy sources, a poor propensity for the usage of climate funds by countries 
is expected. The share of the female population (female) is included because it has been shown that 
women have stronger preferences for environmental issues and protection (see Zhao et al., 2012). 
Thus, this variable can represent a proxy for the population’s preference for a greener policy 
management, i.e., an indicator of a 'green sentiment' and, consequently, an indicator of the positive 
sensitivity of the population regarding the use of climate funds. Population growth has a far-reaching 
influence on carbon emissions (Feng et al., 2013). Furthermore, we expect that, to meet the global 
demand for energy, countries with a high population growth rate (popgrow) may be more interested 
in climate funds. 
The definitions, data sources and descriptive statistics of the target and control variables for the 
sample (149 countries: treated and untreated) are reported in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1. ABOUT HERE 
 
4. Results and discussion 
The main purpose of climate funds is to help developing countries promote green growth. Our 
analysis can help illuminate what has been achieved during the “fast-start finance” period and to 
draw lessons for international climate finance in the years ahead, when the GCF produces its effects.  
Coherently with the logical scheme of the econometric strategy, the three steps specified in this 
paragraph are performed. The first regards the results of the probit propensity score model in terms 
of the analysis of the determinants driving countries to receive climate funds; the second focuses on 
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the impact that the funds have on the treated countries in terms of effect of the treatment; and, in the 
third, a supplementary analysis of the tradeoff between fossil and RES generation is conducted.  
4.1 Propensity scores matching and balance   
The coefficients of the propensity score probit model are reported in Table 4.1. They respect the 
expected signs and are in line with the results of several recent analyses of the determinants that 
drive policymakers in energy policy decisions (see, e.g., Marques and Fuinhas, 2012; Romano et 
al., 2015; Aguirre and Ibikunle, 2014; Romano et al., 2016). 
Table 4.1. ABOUT HERE 
 
The results of climate funds are more attractive for countries characterized by increasing population 
growth rates and high levels of energy consumption. In these countries, most likely, the growing 
population, intensified agricultural practices, an increase in land use and deforestation, 
industrialization and the associated energy use of fossil sources have all led to the increased growth 
rate of GCF abundances in recent years. For this reason, the GCF focuses attention across them by 
investing in low-emission and climate-resilient development with its financial mechanisms. As 
expected, the results of climate funds are also very attractive to countries where the population’s 
preference for a greener policy management is higher. By contrast, oil-exporting countries and those 
that are more oriented toward the use of traditional energy sources (high energy intensity) prove to 
be more resistant to these types of policies in support of renewable energy generation because they 
imply structural changes in their generally well-defined industrial structures and economic systems. 
The fact that the results of the probit model confirm several consolidated issues is an important 
starting point for the next step of the work, which concentrates on the analysis of the impact of the 
funds on the countries that have obtained them. Moreover, the matching performed using the fitted 
values of the model (the propensity scores) ensures that the similarities between matched countries 
are respected, with the only exception being energy intensity; the average values of the control 
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variables of the untreated countries are not significantly different from those of the countries to 
which they have been matched (Table 4.2 column 2). 
Tab. 4.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Additionally, the distribution of the scores of treated and untreated countries (Fig. 4.1) confirms that 
the propensity score model is able to capture the similarities between the two groups. 
 
Fig. 4.1. ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2 Estimating the effectiveness of climate funds: the treatment effect 
The treatment effect on treated (ATT) represents a comparison between the observed values and the 
expected values of the target variables for the treated countries if they had not participated in the 
treatment. Countries that have received funds, in fact, are similar, in terms of the control variables, 
to the countries that have not received funds to which they have been matched. However, they are 
different in terms of the target variables, and the basic hypothesis is that this difference is due to the 
treatment. Table 4.3 reports the values of the estimated ATT; analyzing its results, it emerges that 
electricity generation in treated countries is, on average, significantly higher than that in untreated 
countries. Following the logical scheme of the previous issues, this result can be interpreted as a 
growth in efficiency in electricity-generation processes.  
In terms of CO2 emissions, without the funds, there would have been no differences between treated 
countries and their similar matched countries. Instead, the significant reduction in the per capita CO2 
emissions of treated countries is a result that is in line with the theoretical background of this paper 
and with the global climate finance architecture. Climate finance mechanisms, in fact, are 
conditioned to efforts to reduce emissions. However, although expected, this result is helpful in 
quantifying the effects of the main aim of this policy. 
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Focusing on per capita GDP, we observe another difference between treated and untreated countries. 
On average, the GDP of countries that have received funds increases approximately 1,600 euro with 
respect to that of the counterfactual part. This result confirms those of several recent studies on the 
positive effects of climate financing on the economies of developing countries (Jakob et al. 2015, 
Ellis et al. 2013), with renewable energy being a crucial component for the economic growth of 
developing countries (Saidi and Ben Mbarek, 2016). 
Observing the estimation results, we note that treated countries have, on average, a share of energy 
produced by renewable sources (RES) that is significantly higher with respect to their similar 
untreated countries by approximately 20 percentage points. Complementarily, the share of energy 
produced by fossil fuel is significantly lower, on average, by approximately 21% with respect to the 
counterfactual part of countries. Without the funds, they would also be similar in terms of the target 
variables, and these differences, in fact, are due to the climate funds that, having been disbursed at 
least two years ago, have increased the share of electricity generated by RES. This important result 
suggests that climate finance can help countries increase investments in RES generation and can 
substitute for fossil power generation.    
Tab. 4.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.3 Explaining the substitution effect between fossil and RES generation 
To better investigate the last issue that emerged in light of the results of the treatment effect, we 
propose a supplementary detailed analysis based on the utility of fossil and renewable generation. 
The substitution effect on the optimal choice of Renewable (θ1) and Fossil (θ2) generation is a 
disputed point in the literature. A recent work by Salim et al. (2014) using a panel dataset of OECD 
countries shows that there is a long-term equilibrium relationship among non-renewable and 
renewable energy sources. Other studies (see, e.g., Al-mulali et al., 2014) show that countries that 
increase their investment in renewable energy projects increase the role of electricity consumption 
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from renewable sources compared to that from non-renewable sources.  
The substitution effect revealed in terms of the sources of energy generation induces not only a 
reduction in CO2 emissions but also an increase in electricity generation and, consequently, an 
increase in their utility2.  
For the sake of simplicity, we consider that the utility of electricity generation can be a function of 
RES (θ1) and fossil generation (θ2), U(θ1, θ2).  
This utility function represents the level of satisfaction obtained by a country as a function of its 
capacity to generate power; thus, the level of utility U is measured in terms of electricity generation.
 
The reason for this choice is based on the assumption that, in the decision on the amount of 
electricity generation, policymakers examine the tradeoff between the necessity to support economic 
operators and the concerns for preserving natural resources and the environment. The hypotheses 
underlying this assumption are that, in managing the tradeoff, policymakers are faced with a direct 
choice regarding how to compose the basket of sources of energy to generate electricity. The former 
are consolidated, less expensive and more established to support the productive processes but have 
a stronger environmental impact, whereas the latter require investments and structural resizing but 
have a higher degree of sustainability (Weigelt and Shittu, 2016; Nazari et al. 2015). 
The optimal pair of function settings (θ1, θ2) is that for which the transformed utility U is maximized 
under the budget constraint: 
Y = C1θ1+ C2θ2 + (()θ1 | εX) 4.1 
where C1 and C2 are the unit costs of energy generated by renewable and fossil sources, respectively, 
and () is the average amount of each climate fund’s policy supported by GCF. Consequently, 
                                                          
2 Previous studies of the application of utility functions to energy generation have explored how they can be used to 
quantify and manage the tradeoffs in the production processes between emissions and energy consumption (Sims et al., 
2003; Noblet et al., 2015; Pohekar and Ramachandran 2003). They are more concerned with issues such as costs and 
investments. In this work, we want to analyze the tradeoff between fossil and RES generation.  
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developing countries that are involved in reducing, with a target ε (0<ε≤1), their GHG emissions 
(X) to enforce renewable energy generation projects can benefit from various instruments by using 
different and multiple policies (Romano et al., 2017). For untreated countries, i.e., countries that are 
not disbursed funds, F = 0; for treated countries, the higher the ε is, the greater the amount of ().  
Maximization can be obtained through the Lagrange multiplayer method: 
L= U(θ1, θ2) + λ(Y – C1θ1 - C2θ2 – [()θ1 | εX]) 4.2 
and its partial derivatives: 
*+
*, = uθ/ −  λC − [(
)|εX] = 0  
that is,  
uθ/ = λC − [()|εX] 4.3 
 
and 
*+
*,/ = uθ −  λ C/ = 0  
that is,  
uθ = λ C2   4.4 
Equation 4.3 indicates that, for untreated countries, which have ()=0, only the unit costs of renewable 
energy, C1, influence the choice regarding the amount of fossil energy sources, θ2, for determining 
the optimal level of electricity generation. For treated countries, the amount of (), related to the GHG 
emissions reduction targets, is also considered. In particular, for these countries, the greater the 
emissions reduction target is, the higher the amount of funds, (), and the lower the burden of fossil 
energy sources, θ2, in determining the optimal level of electricity generation.  
Under the assumption of a multiplicative form of energy utility functions (see, e.g., Pohekar and 
Ramachandran 2004; Silva et al., 2015):  
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5 = 6 7,
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
 
where k is an overall scaling constant and uj(.) is the utility function operator for each attribute j. 
The country’s utility value can be represented by a linear logarithmic function: 
log(U)=log(k) + u1log(θ) + u2log(θ/) 4.5 
The parameters of equation 4.5, i.e., k, u1 and u2, represent the elasticities of θ1 and θ2 and have been 
estimated by OLS both for the function of untreated countries (66 observations) and for the function 
of treated countries (83 observations). They are all significant (at the level of 99.9%) and very 
different. In fact, for the countries that have received climate funds, the elasticity of ,is higher with 
respect to the elasticity of ,/. The result for the countries that have not received climate funds is the 
opposite. Figure 4.2 reports the representation of the elasticities for treated and untreated countries. 
Fig. 4.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The figures lead us to confirm that both estimated utility functions respect the theoretical assumption 
of Equation 4.3. Countries that receive climate funds are incentivized to promote the use of energy 
by renewable sources for the higher benefits obtained in terms of electricity generation. In fact, in 
these countries, a unit increase in the use of energy by renewable sources implies a growth in 
electricity generation that is higher than what would have occurred if the same increase concerned 
the use of energy by fossil sources. The increasing deployment of RESs has positive impacts in a 
number of key areas such as climate change mitigation, by reducing the impact of anthropogenic 
activities on the atmosphere, and energy security, by reducing the demand for imported fossil fuels 
and energy efficiency.   
 
6. Conclusions 
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Climate funds are partnering with a growing variety of international and developing country-based 
institutions; the number of implementing agencies has expanded from the three original 
organizations to approximately 40 institutions (Nakhooda and Norman, 2014): regional 
development banks, international organizations, developing country ministries, trust funds and 
NGOs. Moreover, because their official scope is to help the institution to combat climate change, in 
this paper, we have derived a model to evaluate the effectiveness of a policy intervention based on 
the differences, over a given policy evaluation horizon, between the post-intervention realizations 
of the target variables and the associated counterfactual outcomes.  
The combined interpretation of the results seems to provide positive responses to the research 
questions of the paper regarding the effectiveness of climate finance initiatives. Climate funds have 
a positive effect in terms of reducing the electricity generated by fossil sources and, consequently, 
in terms of reducing CO2 emissions. Another important result that arises from the analysis is that, 
in the recipient countries, a substitution effect between fossil and renewable sources in electricity 
production occurs: the increase in energy produced by renewable sources balances the fossil part 
that is no longer produced.  
The results confirm that climate funds reduce the magnitude of the fossil contribution to the overall 
energy utility of the countries in which the funds are distributed.  
Incentivizing this replacement does not imply negative consequences for economic growth because, 
from the analysis, positive effects in terms of energy efficiency and in terms of an economic stimulus 
to reach sustainable development also emerge. The results of the analysis, in fact, show that, in the 
recipient countries, with respect to the counterfactual part, an increase in both electricity generation 
and per capita GDP occurs.  
This paper analyzes the overall effectiveness of all of the funds in all of the recipient countries, but 
in some cases, climate finance may have failed. After all, it has now been more than two decades 
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since the problem of climate change became a topical issue, and only little progress in implementing 
the global agreement to limit the increase in temperature to 2°C has been made. In the light of these 
considerations, we think that further studies are needed to help researchers investigate whether 
climate finance is a path on which to continue or whether we must arm ourselves with other 
instruments to support this objective. Furthermore, because, in the literature, increasing interest in 
the existence of a substitution effect between RES and fossil sources in electricity production 
systems has begun to form and, to evaluate the instruments to limit climate change, studies are still 
going through a learning phase, this work can represent a starting point to begin a discussion on this 
relevant research topic and to make a contribution to the actual literature. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 3.1. Data: Definitions, descriptive statistics and sources. 
Label Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
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Control Variables 
elcons 
The electric consumption (log of) is the electric 
power consumption equal to the sum of total net 
electricity generation and electricity imports net 
of the electricity exports and electricity 
transmission and distribution. losses  
Billion 
Kilowatt
-hours 
1.55 2.36 -3.84 8.24 
The U.S. 
Energy 
Information 
Administration 
(EIA) 
oil 
Total Oil Supply includes the production of crude 
oil (including lease condensate), natural gas plant 
liquids, and other liquids, and refinery processing 
gain. 
Thousan
d 
Barrels 
Per Day 
464 1,429 -0.54 10,908 
ei 
Energy intensity using purchasing power parities 
is calculated by dividing the data on total primary 
energy consumption in quadrillion British thermal 
units for each country and year by the gross 
domestic product using purchasing power parities 
in billions of (2005) U.S. dollars for each 
available country and year. 
Btu per 
Year 
2005 
U.S. 
Dollars 
(PPP) 
6,759 6,215 199 50,976 
female Female population is the percentage of the population that is female 
% of 
total 49.74 3.48 24.65 54.31 World Bank (World 
Development 
Indicators) popgrow Population growth rate annual % 1.70 1.56 -2.10 10.40 
Target Variables 
shfoss 
Fossil Fuels electricity generation consists of 
electricity generated from coal, petroleum, and 
natural gas. 
% of 
total 0.66 0.34 0.00 1.00 The U.S. 
Energy 
Information 
Administration 
(EIA) 
shren 
Renewable electricity generation includes 
generation from hydroelectric and not 
hydroelectric sources 
% of 
total 0.33 0.34 0.00 1.00 
elgen 
Indicator of electric power generated from all 
sources. Ratio between electric power generated 
and share of population covered by electric grids 
Billion 
Kilowatt
-hours 
69.51 350.96 0.02 4,051 
co2 Per capita carbon dioxide emissions including Land-Use Change and Forestry 
Million 
metric 
tons 
4.09 6.49 0.03 46.7 World Bank 
(World 
Development 
Indicators) gdp 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product 
converted to international dollars. 
Constant 
2011  12,367 16,274 698 127,670 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 4.1 Coefficients and goodness of fit 
statistics of the probit propensity score model 
(std. errors are in parenthesis) 
Variable Coefficient 
intercept 
-4.7212 
(0.0697) 
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log(elcons) 0.3688*** 
(0.0697) 
oil 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
log(ei) 
-0.3694** 
(0.1665) 
female 0.1442** 
(0.0655) 
popgrow 0.2245* 
(0.1206) 
Loglikelhood -81.4814 
Pseudo R2 0.3265 
Significance: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 
0.1  
 
Tab. 4.2 Tests of balance: similarities of means of the control variables before 
and after matching 
  
Before Matching After Matching 
log(elcons) 
Mean Treated  2.2136 2.2136 
Mean Untrated 0.7167 2.5152 
p-value 0.0001 0.1424 
oil 
Mean Treated  407.1200 407.1200 
Mean Untrated 535.0500 268.9200 
p-value 0.6155 0.2911 
log(ei) 
Mean Treated  8.4311 8.4311 
Mean Untrated 8.5444 8.7647 
p-value 0.4435 0.0046 
female 
Mean Treated  50.2560 50.2560 
Mean Untrated 49.0910 49.9850 
p-value 0.0697 0.5506 
popgrow 
Mean Treated  1.6457 1.6457 
Mean Untrated 1.7591 1.7123 
p-value 0.6837 0.8174 
 
Tab. 4.3 Average treatment effects on treated 
Variable ATT 
shren 0.2052 
(0.0149) 
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Fig. 4.1 Scatterplot of propensity scores of treated and untreated countries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
shfoss 
-0.2100 
(0.0154) 
co2 
-7.0423 
(0.0008) 
elgen 0.8649 
 (0.0850) 
gdp 1,606.7 
(0.0150) 
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Fig.4.2 Marginal effects for treated and untreated countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
